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January 26, 1967
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 FYI

Talking Points
for
Diehl Meeting

Non-Proliferation

1. Interpretations. Our views on meaning NPT will emerge from Senate hearings and debates. If LTB practice followed, Sovs not ratify until after Senate vote. They can then be assumed have knowledge of interpretations. There have already been private talks on many of these points, but we do not intend seek "agreed interpretations" or to state sensitive U.S. interpretations in public forum where Sovs would be challenged to reply.

2. Preamble. We believe preamble should declare intention of nuclear powers to achieve a halt in the nuclear arms race at the earliest possible date. Should also call for nuclear disarmament in context GCD.

We propose make a statement on nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes. We believe nuclear-weapon states should make them available to non-nuclear-weapon states if and when they become technically and economically feasible. This is still some distance off and we therefore reluctant put anything on this in NPT.

We will oppose attempts by non-nuclear states ~~to~~ to put Kosygin-type proposals on non-use nuclear weapons in NPT. Such proposals pose difficulties of discrimination among NATO allies; provide no means of verification re existence of nuclear weapons on non-nuclear territory; and would give no assurance to Indians or Japanese who threatened by China. We hope our allies, who have NATO treaty guaranties from us, will not urge non-aligned to seek similar guaranties. U.S. in no position to extend such guaranties to others.

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